Hackers Broke Voting Machines in 90 Minutes? Facts

Yes, at a 2017 DEF CON conference, a team of hackers successfully accessed and modified a voting machine’s software in about 90 minutes. However, this was a controlled test on an obsolete, unpatched machine that was no longer used in elections, not a real-world attack on an active voting system. The event highlighted security weaknesses in older equipment, but it does not mean that current voting systems are easily hacked or that elections are routinely compromised.

Formula

The calculator above uses two basic formulas to convert your time and distance into an average pace and speed.

Pace = Time (minutes) ÷ Distance (kilometers)
Speed = Distance (kilometers) ÷ (Time (minutes) ÷ 60)

Where:

• Time is the total time spent, in minutes.
• Distance is the distance covered, in kilometers.
• Pace is the average time per kilometer, in minutes per kilometer (min/km).
• Speed is the average speed, in kilometers per hour (km/h).

Worked Example

Using the default values from the calculator (90 minutes and 10 km):

1. Pace = 90 minutes ÷ 10 km = 9.0 min/km
2. Speed = 10 km ÷ (90 minutes ÷ 60) = 10 km ÷ 1.5 hours = 6.67 km/h

So, if you run 10 km in 90 minutes, your average pace is 9 minutes per kilometer, and your average speed is 6.67 km/h.

What the 90-Minute Hack Actually Was

At the 2017 DEF CON hacking conference, a group of security researchers and hobbyists were given access to a used voting machine that had been purchased from an online auction site. The machine, a model that was no longer certified for use in U.S. elections, was intentionally set up as a challenge. The participants found that they could access the machine’s firmware, modify its software, and even change the way it counted votes. The 90-minute figure refers to the time it took for the first successful modification, not a full-scale attack on a live election system.

It’s important to note that the machine was not connected to any real election network, had no security updates applied, and was not representative of the newer, more secure voting systems used today. The exercise was designed to expose vulnerabilities in older equipment and to encourage manufacturers to improve security.

How Voting Machines Work

Modern voting machines come in several types, but the most common are Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) machines and optical scan systems. DRE machines allow voters to cast their ballots directly on a touchscreen, which stores the vote electronically. Optical scan systems require voters to fill in a paper ballot, which is then scanned and counted by a machine. Many jurisdictions now use a hybrid approach: a DRE machine that prints a paper record, or an optical scanner that also creates a paper trail. This paper trail is crucial for audits and recounts.

Voting machines are typically not connected to the internet, which reduces the risk of remote hacking. They are also subject to rigorous testing and certification processes at both the federal and state levels. However, the security of any voting system depends not just on the machine itself, but on the entire process: how ballots are stored, how results are transmitted, and how audits are conducted.

Common Misconceptions About Voting Machine Hacks

One of the most persistent misconceptions is that a single hack on a voting machine can change the outcome of a national election. In reality, elections are decentralized: each state, and often each county, runs its own election with its own equipment and procedures. A hack on one machine in one precinct would only affect the votes cast on that machine, and the paper trail (if present) would allow officials to verify and correct the results. Furthermore, many states conduct post-election audits that compare paper ballots to electronic totals, making it difficult for a machine hack to go undetected.

Another misconception is that voting machines are connected to the internet. While some systems may have network capabilities for transmitting unofficial results, the machines themselves are usually air-gapped (not connected to the internet) during voting. The 90-minute hack did not involve internet access; it was a direct physical attack on the machine’s hardware and software.

How to Choose a Secure Voting System

When election officials select voting systems, they consider several security features:

• Paper trail: A voter-verifiable paper record is essential for audits and recounts.
• Access controls: The machine should require authentication (e.g., a key or smart card) to access its internal software.
• Tamper-evident seals: Physical seals that show if the machine has been opened.
• Certification: The system should meet federal and state standards, such as the Voluntary Voting System Guidelines (VVSG).
• Independent testing: The machine should be tested by an accredited lab before use.

No system is 100% secure, but a combination of paper trails, rigorous testing, and post-election audits provides a strong defense against both hacking and human error.

Common Problems with Voting Machines

Voting machines, like any technology, can malfunction. Common issues include:

• Touchscreen calibration errors: A voter may tap one candidate but the machine registers another.
• Paper jams: Optical scanners can jam if ballots are not properly aligned.
• Battery failures: Machines that rely on batteries may run out of power during a long election day.
• Software bugs: Occasionally, a machine may crash or display an error message.

These problems are usually resolved by poll workers who are trained to handle them, and most jurisdictions have backup procedures in place, such as emergency paper ballots. The key is that these issues are typically visible and can be corrected, unlike a silent hack that alters votes without detection.

Safety and Security Measures

Election officials employ multiple layers of security to protect voting systems:

• Physical security: Machines are stored in locked facilities and monitored during transport.
• Network isolation: Voting machines are not connected to the internet, and any network used for transmitting results is encrypted and monitored.
• Pre-election testing: Machines are tested before each election to ensure they are working correctly.
• Post-election audits: Many states conduct audits where paper ballots are compared to electronic results.
• Penetration testing: Some states hire security experts to try to hack their systems in controlled environments.

These measures are designed to detect and deter attacks, and to ensure that any attempted hack would be caught and corrected.

Alternatives to Electronic Voting

Given the concerns about electronic voting machines, some jurisdictions have moved to hand-marked paper ballots counted by optical scanners, or even fully hand-counted ballots. Hand-marked paper ballots are generally considered the most secure because they leave a physical record that can be audited without relying on software. Optical scanners are faster than hand counting but still produce a paper trail. Some countries, like Germany, use paper ballots almost exclusively. The trade-off is speed and cost: hand counting is slower and more expensive, but it eliminates the risk of software hacks entirely.

Frequently Asked Questions

Can voting machines be hacked remotely?

Most voting machines are not connected to the internet, so remote hacking is extremely difficult. However, some machines have wireless capabilities or are connected to networks for transmitting results, which could theoretically be exploited. That’s why many security experts recommend that voting machines be air-gapped and that any network used for results be encrypted and monitored.

Did the 90-minute hack prove that elections are insecure?

No. The hack was performed on an obsolete machine with no security updates, in a controlled environment. It demonstrated that older equipment has vulnerabilities, but it did not show that current systems are easily hacked. Modern machines have better security, and the overall election process includes many safeguards beyond the machine itself.

What is a VVPAT?

VVPAT stands for Voter-Verifiable Paper Audit Trail. It is a paper record that the voter can see and verify before their vote is cast. The paper is then stored and can be used for audits or recounts. VVPAT is considered a key security feature because it provides a physical record independent of the machine’s software.

How do I know my vote was counted correctly?

In jurisdictions with a paper trail, you can verify that your ballot was recorded correctly on the paper record before you submit it. After the election, you can also check the official results to see if the totals match your expectation, though you cannot trace your individual vote. Post-election audits provide an additional layer of verification by comparing paper ballots to electronic totals.

Are paper ballots more secure than electronic ones?

Generally, yes. Paper ballots cannot be hacked, and they provide a physical record that can be audited. However, the counting process (whether by hand or by optical scanner) can still have errors. The most secure approach is a combination of paper ballots and rigorous audits.

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in t | Time spent | minutes | 90 | 0
in d | Distance traveled | km | 10 | 0
out pace | Average pace | min/km | t / d | 2
out speed | Average speed | km/h | d / (t / 60) | 2